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A Proposal on the Law of the Sea
ALEXANDER NADESAN

Bemidji State College, Bemidji
ABSTRACT - There has been no agreement until now on the breadth of the territorial sea. This
study proposes a uniform law on the breadth of the territorial sea. The concept of the three-mile
limit is reviewed briefly. The question of national security is analyzed and the consequences of
extending the breadth of the territorial sea beyond six miles is also discussed .

The Doctrinal Development of Territorial Sea Law

The subject of the law of the sea is a vital question in
the mid-twentieth century. The question of the freedom
of the seas has been a central point in numerous international disputes since the early history of human civilization. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Dutch
and the British refused to accept the supremacy of the
Portuguese and the Spanish who then ruled the vast
oceans with their mighty naval fleets.
In 1609, Hugo Grotius published his Mare Liberum
(Freedom of the Sea) to counteract any claim of monopoly by one nation to the vast oceans. Grotius' Mare
Liberum, addressed to "the rulers and the free independent nations of Christendom" has been regarded as
a most important law because of the great expansion of
commercial enterprise taking place. As a result of expansion, the new growing nations in Europe, for their
own interests, preferred the sea to be free for all nations
instead of being appropriated by the powerful. The central thesis of Grotius was that the sea was free for all.
Grotius stated that no one could gain ownership of a
property by possession without occupation . The implication is that since the ocean cannot be occupied effectively, it is res communis (common to all), that is, "belongs to no one and open equally to all." 1
The writing of Grotius was attacked by other writers
(Grotius was at that time in the minority among the
writers), one of whom was John Selden. In 1618 Selden
published his Mare Clausum, stating that parts of the
sea had actuaHy been appropriated by England. 2 In the
18th century Grotius' law gained support from van
Bynkershoek, whose work, De Dominio Maris Dissertatio (Freedom of the Seas), was published in 1703. 3
Alexander G. Nadesan, is currently an Assistant Professor
of Political Science at Bemidji State College Minnesota. He
received his degrees from the following schools : Islamic University of North Sumatra, L.L.B. certificate 1956, B.A. Gustavus Adolphus College, Minnesota, 1958, M.A. University of
Minnesota, I 961. Currently a doctoral candidate at the School
of International Service, The American University. SmithMundt Scholar. During 1963-64 was with the U. S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 1965 Summer Visiting Lecturer
of Political Science at Wartburg College, Iowa.
I. Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum, translated by Magoffin,
The Freedom of the Seas. London: Oxford University Press,
1916, p. 2.
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As a result of the publication of Bynkershoek's work
at the beginning of the 18th century, the question of the
appropriation of the sea opened another debate. Bynkershoek was concerned in Freedom of the Seas with the
question of delimitation of the territorial sea immediately
adjacent to the coast. Bynkershoek recognized the fact
that the seas could be effectively occupied to the maritime belt measured by the range of a cannon shot. 4
Bynkershoek thus assigned to a state the dominion of
the adjacent sea (Mare Proximum) within the range of
a cannon shot from the shore where guns were actually
in position. Marginal waters were thus subject to possession, occupation and, therefore, ownership. Bynkershoek's formula of cannon range was gradually adopted
by many states in fixing their territorial waters. Since
there was not a clear agreement among the nations at
that time on the precise limit of territorial waters, publicists refused to accept the Bynkershoek formula in the
beginning. It was not until sometime later in the 18th
century that writers gradually recognized the cannon
shot limit."
With the change of doctrine came the change of practice. The principles of the freedom of the seas and a
narrow breadth of territorial sea was accepted. By 1900
the theoretical principle of the three-mile or one league
limit had been adopted or acknowledged as law by some
20 states. Even though other states did not acknowledge
the three-mile limit, they did not contest its validity. It
may, therefore, be said that at the turn of the century the
three-mile limit had been accepted as the customary rule
of international law. A notable exception was the Scandinavian countries who had adopted a four-mile limit of
territorial waters.
State Practice from 1930 to 1958

From 1930 to the 1958 United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, the practice of states in regard to the
extent of territorial waters in the 20th century had been
very arrogant in their claim to the limit of territorial waters. At The Hague Conference on territorial waters,
States for the first time challenged the rule of international law fixing the breadth of the territorial waters at
three miles. The failure of the 1930 Conference at The
Hague to set a precise limit on the breadth of the terri4. Ibid., Chapter 2.
5. Emmerick Vattel, Droits des Gens, English translation by
Charles Fenwick, Classic of International Law. Washington,
1916, p. 65. Though Vattel did not come forward to support
the three-mile limit but did support the complete jurisdiction
of the sea by the costal state.
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torial sea provoked some states to extend their territorial waters beyond the customary three-mile limit. The
primary motivation threatening the extension of territorial waters seemed to be the desire for greater control of fishing. Though some states challenged the law
they did not extend their territorial waters beyond the
customary three-mile limit until World War II. The
large number of states claiming more than three miles of
territorial waters prior to the Geneva Conference on the
Law of the Sea did so for the first time after the conclusion of the war.
The Legal Situation at the Opening of the 19S8
Geneva Conference on the Territorial Waters

The increasing use of the sea and the products of the
sea since World War ll have made it essential that states
give much greater attention to the question of control of
territorial waters. The desire to control fishing particularly was probably the motivation behind the action
taken for extending the territorial waters. On the basis
of state practice in early 1958, just prior to the Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea, there were no more
than 27 of the 73 coastal states who claimed a specific
breadth of territorial sea in excess of three miles. Chile ,
Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru claimed zones of 200
miles. The disputes over territorial waters were further
widened at the opening of the Geneva Conference.
The failure of the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences
on the Law of the Sea under the auspices of the United
Nations extended the claims of nations for wider control
of the sea unilaterally. A major problem of high international concern involves the question on the breadth of
the territorial sea. How far seaward should a state's sovereignty extend? Planes and ships have been fired on and
international incidents over coastal fishing have taken
place. In recent years, several of the newly independent
states have unilaterally extended their territorial waters
to 12 miles. At the present moment 40 states still claim
three-mile limits; 34 states claim 12-mile limits; 21
states claim six-mile limits; while others claim four miles
or more. It seemed now that the basis for claiming wider
territorial waters - other than fishing for the purpose of
food - is the question of national security. Growing n::itionalism in the world with tensions also causes many
nations to extend their territorial waters claims. It is
probably for prestige that some of the newer states claim
wider territorial waters in order to keep up with the
neighboring states.
A realistic appraisal of the situation would seem to indicate that a change of position in this area in the interest of the world is desirable instead of assertions of
sovereignty over the immense areas of the high seas. The
question of the extent of the territorial sea should be
examined in the light of some of the pertinent arguments
that have been advanced in favor of extending the threemile limit.
A Proposal on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea

The principle of the freedom of the seas must be maintained without further extending the territorial waters.
It is, therefore, urgent to find a solution to this problem
156

by enacting a uniform law through international convention . Unless this is done soon, many of the world's strategic straits and narrow water channels along the continental margins and between islands would be converted
from high seas to territorial waters. Therefore, a proposal for a minimum extension of six miles of territorial
waters on the breadth of the territorial sea should be allowed to all nations. Such an extension would better
serve the freedom of the oceans; otherwise there is likely
to be a continuation of serious international incidents
and encroachment of the oceans. An extension of the
territorial sea is proposed here as a solution only after
an objective analysis reveals that the problem cannot be
resolved within the context of the concept of res communis or on the reasoning of the traditional three-mile
limit, and that there is an actual need for extending that
limit.
The extension of territorial waters to six miles without further extension will serve the fishing resources adjacent to coastal states. The existing law concerning conservation in seas adjacent to foreign states is quite adequate. In fact, the work of the Geneva Conference on
fish conservation and related matters, if ratified by a sufficient number of states, will in almost all cases eliminate
whatever legitimate need there might be for an extension of the territorial sea.
Furthermore, the law on the continental shelf should
be adequate for any mineral or other natural resources
to be claimed. Any claim beyond the six-mile proposal
of territorial waters does not seem to warrant any justification. Unilateral claims to sovereignty or other forms
of exclusive control over waters heretofore recognized
as high seas cannot be regarded as valid. This is not to
say that the reasons, legitimate or otherwise, that motivate such claims should be ignored. The remedy is not
unilateral action; an effort should be made to reach
agreement on the principles of that law. The complexity
of the maritime boundary limit issue has also become for
many a political rather than a legal question.
Effect upon Shipping

The extension of territorial waters to more than six
miles might well create further shipping problems. Efforts
by merchant ships to avoid violating the regulations of
the coastal states in areas that are now open to free navigation could well lead to increased shipping costs, less
profit to the producers of the cargo carried, and higher
prices to the consumer. The increased shippers' costs
would thereby be borne by the countries dependent upon
unhampered sea-borne commerce for their economic existence, and would particularly affect many of the newly
independent countries who have favored larger extension
of the territorial sea. G
It would be extremely expensive for any state with a
sizable coastline to patrol adequately more than six miles
of territorial sea. The United States, for example, has
estimated that an extension of 12 miles of territorial water would necessitate an initial capital outlay of $8 mil6. Arthur H. Dean, "The Law of the Sea," Department of
State Bulletin, 38 (1958), pp. 576-577.
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lion and an increase in annual operating cost of $1,500,000 for each 100 miles of coastline, or an annual increase in expenditure of $180 million for the continental United States alone.7 The newly developing nations
cannot meet any extensive costs to patrol their coastlines
effectively if the territorial sea should be extended to I 2
miles. If a state effectively patrols its coastlines, there is
no point in demanding a wider territorial sea; her sovereignty might be violated by other states.
Effect upon Aircraft

Unlike ships that sail the seas, aircrafts have no "right
of innocent passage" over territorial waters. Only above
the high seas is there an absence of any restrictions pertaining to sovereign rights. The complicated structure of
international airways with their technical requirements
must in all cases conform to the sovereign pattern of land
and the marginal seas. What would happen to aircraft
when claim to the ocean is extended to 12 miles? What
would happen to the safety of air traffic? Each mile in
the air denied to commercial aircraft - as by demands
for greater breadth of the territorial sea - offsets that
much the great advances made by the aeronautical industry. Planes of one state may fly over the territorial
sea of another state only by bilateral or multilateral
agreements, and such accord is by no means always assured in the present-day world. What then is the fear
of foreign aircraft flying over a state's territory?
With the extension of territorial waters, aircraft must
fly many extra miles to avoid overflight of certain sovereign territory. The unreasonable extension of territorial
waters will only harm commercial aircraft, since military
aircraft is forbidden to fly over the air space and territorial waters of another state without prior consent, or
without the risk of anti-aircraft fire. The effect on military aircraft, however, would be even more drastic since
it has no right of innocent passage over straits connecting
areas of the high seas.
The Question of National Security

The law of the territorial sea is linked closely with the
question of national security of the coastal State. Thus
the doctrine of the freedom of the seas is not a mere historical relic of the so-called time when maritime law
was developed; the question of coastal defense was clearly included. The question of national security became an
important issue both at the 1958 and the 1960 Conferences on the Law of the Sea, and was particularly noted
by states urging 12-mile limits on contiguous zones,
aside from problems of fishing, customs control, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary controls. The principal difficulty was that a number of the participating delegations
were wholly unwHiing to accept a six-mile territorial
sea unless it were to be accompanied by recognition of
protective controls over the contiguous zone.
The United States delegate in 1960, referring to the
question of security, indicated that the adoption of a 12mile limit for the territorial sea would restrict the freedom of navigation and result in longer trade routes and,
7. Ibid., p. 577.
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hence, push up shipping costs and commodity prices.
This view was challenged by the Soviet delegate, who
pointed out that the security question of a state is well
safeguarded by the generally recognized right of innocent passage. "Furthermore, the free passage of ships
and commercial aircraft along established international
routes which crossed the waters of foreign States was
adequately safeguarded in specific multilateral and bilateral agreements which would not be affected by an
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea." 8 As indicated earlier, the security consideration was also referred to in support of the opposite policies, that is, the
older maritime powers saw no objective ground to claim
the wider extent of the territorial sea for the purpose of
defending the coastal State. Since the coastal State could
be defended likewise by not extending the breadth of the
territorial sea or the contiguous zone as demanded by the
12-mile bloc for a wider extension. However, some of
the newly developing states from their past experiences
indicated that they were fearful of possible approach of
foreign warships to their off-shore areas. The following
statements made by the delegates from the developing
states are worth noting (India):
1. For purposes of security, the breadth of the territorial sea was immaterial in time of actual hostilities.
It was in situations short of war that the breadth was
important to coastal States. Some countries seemed
to fear that if they were at war they might have
difficulties in the waters of neutral States with a
twelve-mile territorial sea. Surely, however, the interests of coastal States in peacetime took precedence
over the interests of non-coastal States in time of war.
2. The domination of smaller countries by the Great
Powers was still a vivid reality. Small countries were
fearful of any encroachment by land or sea, particularly of the prolonged sojourn of foreign warships in
their adjacent waters, and were anxious for that reason to lay down a limit of twelve miles for the territorial sea. It would not help the cause of codification
of international law if that genuine apprehension
on the part of small countries was ignored. 8

Every state naturally wishes to safeguard its national
security and the well being of its people when determining the breadth of its territorial sea and fishery limits,
and due consideration should be given to the needs and
circumstances of coastal States. In demanding a wider
territorial sea limit for security, the developing countries
were also fearful of the "gun boat" diplomacy of the
great powers from their past experiences. For example,
the United Arab Republic delegate stated that " . . . he
would emphasize that many small countries were deeply
apprehensive about the possibility of foreign warships
and aircraft staging demonstrations of force off their
coasts." 10 The representative of the U.A.R. also referred
to such demonstrations as a possible means of intimidating the coastal States.11 The Iranian representative stated
8. Second United Nations Conference 011 the Law of tire Sea,
Official R ecords, A / Conf. 19 / 8, 1960, p. 39.
9. Ibid., p. 77; A/ Conf. 19 / SR. 12, 1960, p. 7.
10. Ibid., p. 102.
11. A / Conf. 19 / C. I/SR. 17, 1960, p. 3.
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that "many African, Asian and Latin American States"
had been subjects of colonialism based mainly on naval
power. "The tragic memory of the appearance of warships in the coastal sea, threatening any liberation movement in those countries, was still unforgettable." 1 2
The United States argued against extending the
breadth of the territorial sea for 12 miles for its own security interest. The following statements made by the
Department of State Legal Advisor seem to support it:
If the territorial sea were uniformly extended out
to twelve miles, enemy submarines could operate in
the territorial waters of neutral states with excellent
chances of remaining undetected . This would be particularly true of modern submarines with atomic
power, which are able to remain submerged for long
periods of time. In time of war our surface ships
cannot operate on nor can our aircraft fly over territorial waters of neutral States without violating the
neutrality of these States.
The dangers presented by an extension of the
breadth of the territorial sea from a military standpoint are by no means limited to the perils of submarine warfare. If territorial seas were uniformly extended out to twelve miles, the operation of our
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean would be greatly
circumscribed. The Straits of Gibraltar in their entirety would become territorial waters. . . 1 3

From the United States' point of view as discussed
above, for the purpose of security it was unnecessary to
broaden the territorial sea, since the coastal state exercises complete sovereignty over the belt subject to the
right of innocent passage, when the basic purpose can
be served just as well by a limited jurisdiction over an
additional belt of the contiguous high seas. The United
States was particularly concerned with the security of a
nation, but from a completely different aspect; as the
delegate of the United States to the Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea put it,
The extension of the territorial sea of neutral nations might in many instances increase the striking
power of enemy submarines. This is because normally
submarines cannot safely operate within three miles
of the shore. However, if the territorial sea were extended to twelve miles, an enemy submarine (particularly a nuclear submarine which could operate silently for long periods without surfacing) would be able
to move about undetected in a neutral State's territorial sea, whereas our surface ships could not operate there without violating the State's neutrality. 11
Dean also thought that it would not be advisable to
restrict maneuvering of the United States fleet as a result of wider extension of the territorial sea. According
12. He was referring to the 1958 landing of United States
marines in Lebanon to defend the country, A/Conf. 19/ 8, 1960,
p. 104.
13. Based on a lecture before the American Canne Association
at Chicago, see Loftus Becker, "The Breadth of the Territorial
Sea and Fisheries Jurisdiction," Department of State Bulletin,
40 (March 16, 1960), p. 371.
14. Arthur H. Dean, "Freedom of the Seas," Foreign Affairs, 37 (1958), pp. 89-90.
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to Dean, the operations of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea would have been restricted and the landing of
United States marines in Lebanon would have been legally impossible. The operations of the Seventh Fleet to
defend Quemoy and Matsu on the Formosa Strait would
have been considerably hindered if the territorial sea had
been extended to 12 miles. 1., The United States had also
indicated at the 1958 Conference on the Law of the
Sea that the coastal State had some privileges in its territorial sea already, without necessarily extending the
breadth and the contiguous zone to 12 miles. 16
The same view was also advanced by the Canadian
delegate at the 1960 Conference who added that "the extension of the territorial sea beyond . . . adds nothing
whatever to the ability of any country to defend itself
under modern conditions." 11 The United Kingdom delegate pointed out, in reference to modern warfare, that
policing and controlling in the wide territorial sea were
difficult and costly and that, since it became hard to fix
precisely the position of ships at sea, the likelihood of
incidents would be increased and the safety of coastal
states would be jeopardized as the result.18 This reasoning was intended for those states demanding wider territorial sea for security purposes.
The delegate of the Byelorussian Socialist Soviet Republic sought to explain the real motives of the United
States in advocating a narrow territorial sea, rather than
12 miles of territorial sea, in the following terms: 'The
main objective of the champions of the six-mile limit
was to obtain for their naval forces unconditional, socalled legitimate, access to foreign waters close to coasts
in which they were interested for strategic or political
reasons." rn The Byelorussian delegate then quoted the
statements made by Dean, the chairman of the United
States delegation to the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, at the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the United States Senate, on January 20, 1960:
Our navy would like to see as narrow a territorial
sea as possible in order to preserve maximum possibility of deployment, transit and manoeuvreability on
and over the high seas; free from the jurisdictional
control of individual States.
There are approximately one hundred sixteen important international straits in the world which could
15. This statement is not clear what differences it should
make legally or otherwise, since the landing of United States
troops was invited by the Lebanese Government, unless, Mr.
Dean was implying the movement of the Fleet along the neighboring coastal Slates would have been restricted, if twelve miles
belt had been claimed by those coastal States.
16. A. H. Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea: What was Accomplished," AJIL, 52 (October, 1958), pp.
607-61 l; United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Official Records of the First Committee, A/Conf. 13 / 39, 1958,
5. 26.
17. Second United Nations Conference 011 the Law of the
Sea, Official R ecords, A/Conf. 19/ 8, 1960, p. 50; Official Records
of the Second United Nations Conference 011 the Law of the
Sea, Committee of the Whole, Verbatim Records of the General
Debate, A ! Conf. 1919, 1960, p. 416.
18. Ibid., p. 56.
19. Ibid., p. I 05, A/ Conf. 19/C. I/SR. 17, 1960, p. I 3.
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be the choice of a limit for territorial seas. All would
become subject to national sovereignties if a six mile
rule were adopted . . . of the fifty-two straits which
would become subject to national sovereignties under
a six mile rule, only eleven would come under the
sovereignty of States which would appear likely to
claim the right to terminate or interfere with transit of our warships or aircraft, while denial of passage through these eleven straits would present a defense capability impairment, that impairment is believed to be within tolerable operating limits. On the
other hand, under the twelve mile territorial sea rule,
eighteen straits would come under the sovereignty
of States which possibly would claim the right to
terminate or interfere with the transit of our warships or aircraft, and, of conclusive importance for
defense purposes, the denial of passage through these
additional straits would present for us a completely
unacceptable impairment of our defensive mobility
and capability. 20
Some of the delegates observed the United States
views, as quoted by the Byelorussian delegate, as highly
important psychological factors in the United States
proposal for not wanting a 12-mile limit; and therefore,
they thought more of their national security, but not in
the terms expressed by the United States. They demanded wider territorial sea for the purpose of defense. On
the other hand, the 12-mile bloc thought that the motives behind the United States Government refusal to accept a 12-mile limit was primarily for defense reasons.
The following statement seems to support this position:
A complete analysis and comparison of the effect
of a six mile versus a twelve mile territorial sea has
led to the conclusion, concurred in by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, that the United States should strive
to achieve agreement on as narrow a territorial sea
breadth as possible, but in any event not to exceed
six miles. 21
The United States had also established various security
zones for its national security against possible surprise
attack. The Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and
the Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ).
These security identification zones had been put forward
as zones of control necessary for the self-defense of the
coastal States. With such zones, vast areas of the oceans
are covered in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. 22 Al20. Statements made before the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the United States Senate on January 20, 1960, by Mr. Dean; see
"Department Seeks Senate Approval of Conventions on Law
of Sea," Department of State Bulletin, 42 (January, 1960), pp.
259-260; Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, op. cit., p. 106.
21. Dean, in "Department Seeks Senate Approval of Conventions on Law of Sea," op. cit., pp. 260-261. The British were

also preoccupied with the defense policy, since the United
Kingdom had experienced in both wars against Germany in
1914 and in 1939, due to the use of Germany of Norwegian
neutral territorial waters. See D. W. Bowell, "The Second Conference on the Law of the Sea," International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, 11 (1962), p. 416.
22. McDougal tries lo justify the encroachments on the free-

dom of the seas in the case of experiments near Bikini by invoking the necessary self-defense of the United Slates and the
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though the freedom of flying over the high seas is recognized by international law, there is, however, danger
to these security zones because they still restrict aircraft
of other nationalities flying close to these zones. As Dean
has said,
There is no right for aircraft to overfly another
nation's territorial sea, except under a treaty, with its
consent, or pursuant to the Chicago Civil Aviation
Convention of 1944 as to the contracting parties
there to. 23
Examples of incidents clearly indicate the danger of
such zones. Though the United States and Canada were
not responsible, the Soviet Union had ruthlessly shot
down United States planes and interrupted commercial
as well as military planes on the coasts of the Bering
Sea and the Kurile Islands. 2 ·1
In pursuance of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone, a State may not create a special
security zone adjacent to the territorial sea, restricting
the navigation of foreign vessels. Especially during peacetime, claims to security zones could lead to the destruction of the principle of the freedom of the seas. Even
Bulgaria introduced a proposal at the 1958 Conference
that "the coastal State shall not use the continental shelf
for the purpose of building military bases or any installations which are directed against other states." 25 This
proposal was defeated together with an Indian proposal
of similar nature. 2 6 The Convention on the Continental
Shelf purposely did not deny the right of the coastal
state to build defense installations on its continental
shelf. However, it is quite clear to expect that such defense installations as those permitted for conservation to
result "in any unjustifiable interference with navigation,
fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the
sea . . ,, 21
The result would be complete chaos if every state
fearful of aggression by other states could extend its
sovereignty arbitrarily over parts of the high seas. Moreover, it is questionable whether in view of recent technical and scientific developments, a security zone is of significant strategic value. The following statement is illustrative:
When we recall that three miles once provided
military security because it was the distance of cannon shot from shore, and reflect that missile range is
now five thousand miles or even more, it appears
likely that the maintenance of a belt of territorial
free world. See McDougal, et. al., "The Hydrogen Bomb
Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security," Yale Law
Journal ( 1954-55), p. 648; see also J. A. Martial, State Control
of the Air Space over the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone," Canadian Bar Review (1952), pp. 245-263.
23. A. H. Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea: What was Accomplished," op. cit., p. 607, footnote 8.
24. For various incidents as described by the Soviets for violal•
ing their security zone, see New York Times, July 17, 1960
p. 5, E; ibid., July 22, 1960, p. 1; ibid., June 16, 1960, pp. 45, 48.
25. A/Conf. 13/C. 4/L. 41, 1958.
26. A/Conf. 13/C. 4/L. 57, 1958.
27. Ibid., article 5, par. I.
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seas for military purposes is unnecessary or even
impossible. . . .2 8
Conclusion

The extension of the territorial sea of neutral nations
in time of war might in many instances increase the striking power of enemy submarine~ ~ince, norn~ally, submarines cannot safely operate within three miles of. the
shore. If the territorial sea were extended to 12-miles,
an enemy submarine, particularly a n~clear _submarine
that could operate silently for long penods without _surfacino would be able to move about undetected m a
neutr';;l states' territorial sea. Therefore, the argument
that extension of the territorial sea is necessary in order
to provide for national defense does n_ot seem _to be v~ry
convincing. Most states have great difficulty m_ meetm_g
their obligations as neutrals within a three-mile territorial sea.
As a matter of fact, the Scandinavian countries had
retreated from four miles to three miles in time of war,
and Norway's failure, early in World War II, ~o perform its obligations within three miles actually pre1ud1ced
its neutrality. During the winter of 1939-1940, Germany
evaded a British blockade by moving Swedish iron ore
through Norwegian waters from Narvik, Norway, to the
mouth of the Baltic. 29 Norway, however, was unable to
prevent German submarines _from s_ink!ng British and
neutral vessels within Norwegian terntonal waters. England had to mine the Norwegian waters, thus forcing
Germany to use the high seas. The g~eat~st weakness,
therefore in the argument that the terntonal sea should
be extended for purposes of defense in the interest of_the
coastal state to 12 miles does not seem to be logical.
The advances of modern technology, including the intercontinental ballistic missile, are merely additional proof
of the fact that the problem of defense cannot be solved
in terms of miles of territorial sea.
Insofar as the breadth of the territorial sea is concerned, many of the United Nations ~elegates had_ little
or no inclination to discuss or consider the ments of
various proposals as principles of int~rn~tional la:W. or
as methods for meeting new needs w1thm the ex1stmg
framework of international law. Moreover, the practice
28. Lawrence W. Wadsworth, "The Changing Concept of the
Territorial Seas," World Affairs, 123 ( 1960), p. 69.
29. See Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1948, p. 531.
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of bloc voting was another factor that tended to discouraoe states from supporting any proposal. The entire Arab
bloc was committed for political reasons to support the
12-mile limit in the hope that it might enhance their
ability to legally close off the Gulf of Aqaba, which is
less than 24 miles in breadth at its widest point.
In conclusion, it can be said that the demands of
coastal states for security purposes have been already
satisfied to some extent by some legal institutions other
than the contiguous sea zone. When a foreign vessel is
detected in the act of some offense within the territorial
sea the institution of "hot pursuit," which has been recog~ized by Article 23 of the Convention on the High
Seas, permits pursuit and capture of the vessel ?n the
high seas. Besides, there are conventions or treaties ~tween states for protection of smuggling or other act1v1ties. It can also be argued that if a state's security is in
danger of infringement of its legitimate interests, t?e
territorial sea belongs to the coastal state as a part of its
territory already. The right of innocent passage was safeouarded in Section III of the Convention on the Terri;orial Sea and the Contiguous Zone adopted in 1958.
Whether a state seeks a six-mile belt of territorial sea
or a 12....,mile belt of territorial sea, it seems that neither
limitation is very pertinent to security because modern
nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines are capable of
doing all the destruction without approaching the shore
of a State.
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